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Marriage is a central institution for social reproduction in East Asia. Until the 1970s and
1980s, marriage across much of East Asia was early and universal. In recent decades,
though, this pattern has begun shifting to one of later and less marriage.
OBJECTIVE
We explore the long-term implications for universal marriage patterns of future
demographic change in marriage markets in the context of prevailing marriage norms by
projecting trends in late singlehood (ages 45 to 49) in four East Asian societies (China,
South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan).
METHODS
We estimate forces of attraction to characterize marriage matching norms by age and
education across these different societies by drawing on large-scale population data.
Next, we develop counterfactual scenarios in which we apply contemporary norms to
future population structures in these societies, as well as scenarios based on more gender-
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symmetrical matching norms to examine how populations who have never been married
by ages 45 to 49 would evolve.
RESULTS
Our projections indicate that in the coming decades there will be a substantial increase in
late singlehood across all these societies relative to their 2010 levels. These increases in
singlehood are driven by forthcoming demographic changes in the marriage market that
intensify the effects of prevailing matching norms. These increases are notable in Taiwan
and South Korea, where recent data indicate generalized weak propensities to marry in
current norms. While a shift toward greater gender symmetry in matching norms would
reverse gender gaps between men and women in nonmarriage, it would have little impact
on the overall projected proportions of singles by ages 45 to 49.
CONCLUSIONS
If prevailing norms in each of these contexts continue, the universality of marriage will
be substantially eroded in the coming decades, even if norms become more gender
symmetrical. The extent to which nonmarital cohabitation and childbearing emerge in the
future will determine how marriage will influence fertility trends, population growth,
aging, and social reproduction.
CONTRIBUTION
For the first time, we project the implications for universal marriage of recent shifts in
marriage norms and demographic change in East Asian countries.
1. Introduction
Marriage is a central institution for social reproduction in East Asia, and in most of Asia
as well. It has profound implications for fertility trends and population growth, as it
continues to be the sole context in which childbearing takes place7 and also shapes access
to family support at older ages (Raymo et al. 2015). Until the 1970s and 1980s, marriage
across much of East Asia was nearly universal, with fewer than 5% of women and men
who remained never married by their late forties (Jones 2010). Marriage also occurred
fairly early and within a concentrated range of ages, especially for women, who generally
married in their early twenties with husbands who were older than they were. Since the
1970s and the 1980s, this early and universal marriage regime began shifting to one of
later and less marriage, particularly in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. More recently,
signs of similar changes have begun to emerge in postreform urban China (Lesthaeghe
7 According to OECD, the share of births outside of marriage in 2016 was 1.9% in South Korea and 2.3% in
Japan.
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2010; Yu and Xie 2015; Jones 2010). The long-term implications of these changes for
universal marriage have yet to be examined for a region where more than one fifth of the
world population resides and, unlike in Western countries, the postponement of marriage
has been accompanied neither by dramatic increases in unmarried cohabitation (Raymo
et al. 2015) nor by significant changes in gender norms (Kan, Hertog, and Kolpashnikova
2019).
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we characterize prevailing marriage matching
norms by age and educational attainment across four East Asian countries using large-
scale population data. Second, we explore potential future cohort trends in singlehood by
ages 45 to 49 (also referred to as late singlehood) in these societies in the context of
prevailing matching norms and shifting demographic composition of their marriage
markets. We focus on the percentage of the single population or those who have never
been married at ages 45 to 49. These ages correspond to the end of the reproduction period
for women (and many men as well), and were also chosen because of the relatively low
occurrence of first marriages or partnerships after them.
We focus our analyses and projections on China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan,
four East Asian countries that have long-standing cultural, political, and historical ties.
They also share a common past of early, gender-asymmetric, and universal marriage
while facing similar social (e.g., rapid educational expansion, in particular among
women) and demographic shifts (e.g., fertility declines and, with the exception of Japan,
skewed sex ratios at birth) in their respective marriage markets. Drawing on best-
available data from censuses, vital registration, and surveys, we start by describing recent
first-marriage patterns in each of these four populations in terms of the prevalence of
marriage by age, sex, and educational attainment. We then characterize matching norms
across these different populations by estimating a force of attraction parameter (Schoen
1988) that captures propensities to marry between men and women by age and
educational attainment. The analysis is restricted to registered first marriages involving
at least one native-born partner. Thus, we include cross-national marriages, which are
particularly important in Taiwan and South Korea. Next, we evaluate the implications of
forthcoming demographic change for late singlehood in each of these populations from
2010 to 2050. We draw on most recent population projections by sex, age, and
educational attainment for China, South Korea, Japan (Lutz, Butz, and KC 2014), and
Taiwan (Cheng and Loichinger 2017). We generate several sets of counterfactual
projections of marriage for each population by applying contemporary matching norms
to future population projections disaggregated first by age and sex and second by age,
sex, and educational attainment. Finally, we generate a set of counterfactual scenarios to
assess the implications of shifts in the gender distribution of matching norms. We
compare in each country the observed scenario, which reflects traditional age and
educational hypergamous norms (i.e., women are more likely to marry older men who
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have higher levels of educational attainment), with two additional scenarios. The first one
assumes perfect gender symmetry in matching norms, and the second one reverses the
pattern from hypergamous to hypogamous (i.e., men are now more likely to marry older
women who have higher levels of educational attainment). This latter trend is consistent
with the global reversal of the gender gap in education and the end of hypergamy (Esteve,
García-Román, and Permanyer 2012; Esteve et al. 2016; Raymo and Park 2020).
Throughout the text, we shall refer to the propensities to marry across sex, age, and
educational groups as either matching norms or marriage norms. By shifts in
demographic composition, we refer to three key trends that will affect the age, sex, and
educational composition of the populations at risk of marriage (‘marriage market’) in the
future. First, the cohorts that will enter the marriage markets in the coming decades will
be progressively less numerous because prior fertility declines have reduced and continue
to reduce the number of births in these societies (Myrskylä, Goldstein, and Cheng 2013).
Second, with the exception of Japan, the East Asian countries under consideration have
witnessed sex ratio at birth distortions since the 1980s and 1990s due to son preference
and the practice of sex-selective abortion. These cohorts have, as a result,
disproportionately more males than females than what would be the case under non-
distorted conditions (Guilmoto 2009). Third, cohorts with substantially higher levels of
education, particularly among women, will enter the marriage market. Although the
societies examined here are at various levels of educational expansion, recent cohorts
have either witnessed faster rates of improvement in postsecondary education for women
relative to men in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea or will do so in coming decades in
China (Lutz, Butz, and KC 2014; Hannum et al. 2019).
2. Characterizing marriage regimes and future demographic change
2.1 Marriage characteristics by sex and educational attainment
Table 1 succinctly characterizes marriage regimes in China, South Korea, Taiwan, and
Japan by showing the proportion of never-married men and women at the ages of 20‒24
and 45‒49 years old by educational attainment. The former age groups provide an indirect
measure of the timing or age at marriage, whereas the latter group is an indicator of the
quantum or universality of marriage. Across all societies, women marry younger than
men and, for both men and women, the high-educated groups marry later than the low-
educated ones. Chinese men and women marry the earliest, as indicated by the lower
percentages of never-married women (67.5%) and men (82.4%) at ages 20‒24 compared
to those in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, which were above 90% for both men and
women.
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Table 1: Description of marriage regimes in four East Asian societies
China 2005 South Korea2010 Taiwan 2010 Japan 2010
F M F M F M F M
% Never married 20‒24
Total 67.5 82.4 94.0 98.5 94.4 98.1 90.2 94.3
Less primary 42.2 78.3 59.1 100.0 - - - -
Primary 42.1 72.2 45.9 93.3 75.4 93.0 68.7 81.2
Secondary 68.5 82.5 94.8 98.8 95.4 98.6 82.2 90.5
Postsecondary 96.6 98.1 95.7 97.4 97.7 99.4 95.7 97.5
% Never married 45‒49
Total 0.4 3.1 3.3 8.1 9.9 12.0 11.7 21.0
Less primary 1.0 22.4 4.9 36.4 - - - -
Primary 0.3 7.1 2.0 17.5 5.3 15.8 18.6 37.2
Secondary 0.4 1.7 2.8 8.1 9.2 11.3 10.3 23.1
University 1.4 0.9 5.4 4.3 17.5 8.8 12.3 16.8
Educational Mating (female perspective)
Homogamous 67.8 79.3 62.2 63.4
Hypergamous 21.9 10.4 19.1 15.2
Hypogamous 10.3 10.3 18.8 21.4
Sources: Population censuses from 2005 China, 2010 South Korea, 2010 Taiwan, and 2010 Japan.
Marriage in China was technically universal for people of the ages 45–49, except
for Chinese men with primary or less education. At the other end, Japan shows the highest
levels of late singlehood for the total population. Across all societies, women show lower
percentages of those who have never been married than men. With the exception of Japan,
postsecondary-educated women indicate the highest proportions who never married by
age 45‒49. Among men and across all societies, the highest proportions of singles are for
the lowest educated and the lowest are for the postsecondary educated. Interestingly, in
Japan both primary-educated women and men show the highest proportions never
married.
The marriage patterns described in Table 1 are the product of both marriage
matching norms and the demographic composition of marriage markets. In the next
section, we describe a measure to isolate matching norms by age, sex, and educational
attainment from demographic composition.
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2.2 Forces of attraction
The harmonic mean marriage function proposed by Schoen (1988) provides a simple,
elegant function to link the numbers of marriages occurring to the population at risk of
experiencing marriage and allows for the estimation of a parameter that captures the
composition-independent propensity or likelihood of marriage (see Appendix 1 for
details of data and method). This parameter captures the desirability of marriage and
matching norms between men and women of specific age (i, j) and educational
characteristics (k, l). If men (Mik) and women (Wjl) with given characteristics randomly
encounter each other at equal rates, then higher propensities to marry ( ) indicate that
higher rates of such encounters are likely to result in marriage (Qian and Preston 1993:
483).
Figure 1 presents forces of attraction parameters (ij) by age for men and women.
Each cell denotes the matching propensity for men (husbands) of a particular age group
i (indicated on the x-axis) with women (wives) of a particular age group j (indicated on
the y-axis) within a country square. The cells that lie on the diagonal indicate age-
homogamous unions, those below the diagonal indicate age hypergamy (husband is older
than wife), and those above the diagonal indicate age hypogamy (wife is older than
husband). China shows significantly higher forces of attraction, or in other words,
stronger matching norms across all ages compared with the other three countries, as
indicated by the darker colors across the grid of cells for these countries. As denoted by
the darker cells at earlier ages and, in particular, below the diagonal, China shows earlier
matching norms and stronger hypergamous norms than Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
 ijkl
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Figure 1: Forces of attraction (ij) between never-married men and women in
the marriage market by age groups in four East Asian societies
Source: Own elaborations based on China: 2000 and 2005 1% population inter-census survey; South Korea: 2001‒2009 vital statistics,
2001 and 2010 population census; Taiwan: 2010 vital statistics and 2010 population census; Japan: 2010 National Fertility Survey.
Figure 2 shows forces of attraction by age and education (ijkl) for China, South
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. A set of 4x4 squares are depicted for each population, in which
each square shows all ijkl values corresponding to a combination of husband and wife’s
educational categories at different ages (represented by cells within the larger squares).
In all cases, the figure shows that norms for educational homogamy are strongest, and
especially so in the group when both partners have postsecondary education (topmost
right square).
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Figure 2: Forces of attraction (ijkl) between never-married men and women by
age groups and educational attainment in four East Asian societies
Source: Own elaboration based on China: 2000 census and 2005 1% population inter-census survey; South Korea: 2001‒2009 vital
statistics, 2001 and 2010 population census; Taiwan: 2010 vital statistics and 2010 population census; Japan: 2010 National Fertility
Survey.
Table 2 summarizes key indicators linked to the strength of matching norms and
propensities of matching by education for each of the societies based on the ijkl values.
The sum of ijkl captures how strong matching norms are across all age–education
combinations – higher values correspond to more universal marriage regimes. Table 2
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also notes the extent to which homogamous, hypergamous, and hypogamous propensities
by education account for all propensities, and how much matching propensities among
the postsecondary-educated group account for all observed matching propensities.
Table 2: Key indicators linked to the strength of matching norms across









Sum of αijkl 30.7 9.1 7.4 9.6
All educational levels
% homogamous 0.60 0.61 0.54 0.51
% hypogamous 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.23
% hypergamous 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.26
Tertiary education only
% homogamous 0.14 0.33 0.29 0.29
% hypogamous 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.15
% hypergamous 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.16
    ratio hyper / hypo 2.99 1.87 1.34 1.05
Source: Own elaboration based on China: 2000 census and 2005 1% population inter-census sample survey; South Korea: 2001‒
2009 vital statistics, 2001 and 2010 population census; Japan: 2010 National Fertility Survey and 2010 population census.
China in Figure 2 shows significantly darker intensities across different ages and
educational categories as compared with the other East Asian societies depicted in Figure
2, and also shows higher values for the sum of ijkl in Table 2. These matching
propensities indicate that marriage norms are universal and earlier. Propensities for
educational hypergamy are stronger in China than the other three East Asian societies, as
well. Although homogamous propensities by education are the highest, when unions are
heterogamous by education, particularly in the postsecondary-educated groups, the ratio
of hypergamous propensities relative to hypogamous propensities are higher than in the
other societies.
In comparison with China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have significantly lower
total levels of forces of attraction. Particularly in Taiwan, but also in South Korea, the
forces of attraction are faint across different groups, indicating weaker propensities to
marry across the educational spectrum, even in comparison to Japan and South Korea. In
Japan, hypergamous matching propensities are balanced by hypogamous matching
propensities, and the ratio among hypergamous to hypogamous propensities among the
postsecondary-educated group is 1.05. In contrast, in South Korea hypergamous norms
appear to be stronger than those in Japan, and South Korea also exhibits a stronger pattern
of educational homogamy among the postsecondary educated. Although at different
levels, overall patterns of educational assortative mating still reflect traditional
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hypergamous norms, indicating that men are more likely to marry down in the
educational hierarchy than women.
The figures for South Korea and Taiwan suggest a marriage regime that is in a state
of flux. These matching propensities depict a cross-sectional picture comprising the
matching behaviors of different cohorts. The cohorts that are now in their late thirties and
forties show weak matching propensities across the educational spectrum because they
belong to cohorts that married at younger ages in their early or late twenties. In contrast,
contemporary matching propensities at younger ages for Taiwan and South Korea are
weak, but prevailing matching norms set no precedent for postponed marriage that is
recuperated at later ages of the late thirties or forties. In comparison, matching
propensities in Japan suggest a marriage regime with norms that allow for heterogamous
unions by education, as well as more flexible age-matching norms that are also indicated
by the darker cells within each square at later ages.
2.3 Demographic change and its implications for marriage
Population projections by age and educational attainment are used in our projection
exercise. For China, Japan, and South Korea, we use the projections published by the
Wittgenstein Centre (Lutz, Butz, and KC 2014), in which information on educational
attainment is incorporated within the medium growth scenarios of United Nations
population projections until 2050 (United Nations 2011). We use the projections
published by Cheng and Loichinger (2017) for Taiwan. Key demographic trends in these
four populations are going to impact on the composition of marriage markets in coming
decades. Since those who will marry in the coming years until 2050 are already born, we
expect these population projections to be reasonably accurate in capturing the size and
composition of these societies for the period of interest. In Appendix 2, we show
population pyramids for these societies in 2010 (observed) and 2050 (projected).
The first of these trends is that of declining birth cohort size as a result of falling or
already low fertility levels. The four East Asian societies analyzed here already have
fertility levels that are well below replacement. Successive birth cohort sizes in all
countries are consequently smaller than older ones, which is likely to disfavor men if age
norms are structured toward older men marrying younger women who come from smaller
cohorts. This pattern of age hypergamy is still quite strong in China.
The second demographic trend that will impact on the composition of marriage
markets for several of these populations is sex ratio at birth (SRB) distortions. First in
South Korea in the 1980s, Taiwan after the mid-1980s, followed by China in the 1990s,
excessively masculine birth cohorts were born as a result of the practice of sex-selective
abortion arising from strong son preference in these societies (Guilmoto 2009; Sharygin,
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Ebenstein, and Das Gupta 2013; Kashyap and Villavicencio 2016; Lee, Lindy, and Florio
2016). SRBs in South Korea began to show a turnaround toward normalization by the
early 1990s, and similar trends have ensued in Taiwan since the 2010s. In China, although
SRBs have started to level off since the mid- to late-2000s, levels remain distorted. In
contrast, Japan did not experience any distortions in its SRBs.
Third, the expansion in female education, particularly in postsecondary education,
that has occurred or is occurring in these societies is likely to impact on the future
composition of marriage markets (Raymo and Iwasawa 2005). Figure 3 shows observed
(1970‒2010) and projected (2020‒2050) population trends on a double axis: the
proportion of the 25‒34 population with postsecondary education (horizontal axis) and
the female advantage in education (vertical axis). This latter indicator captures the
relative likelihood of men and women holding a postsecondary degree. A value of 0.5
represents an equal likelihood of men and women holding a postsecondary degree,
whereas a value of greater than 0.5 indicates a higher likelihood for women having
postsecondary education relative to men (Esteve, García-Román, and Permanyer 2012;
Esteve et al. 2016). This figure highlights how, as levels of postsecondary education have
expanded, women have made faster improvements in postsecondary completion than
men, thereby changing the availability of educated women relative to educated men in
the marriage market. However, the timing of female educational expansion varies across
these societies, with Japan showing the most significant increases in the 1980s. In
contrast, in South Korea and Taiwan, the educational composition by sex is roughly over
a decade behind Japan. The share of postsecondary educated women increased
significantly in the 2000-2010 period in Taiwan. By 2010, women outnumbered men in
postsecondary education in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. In China, men still
outnumber women in postsecondary education, but due to faster rates of improvement
for women relative to men, women are expected to be at par with men in 2050.
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Figure 3: Percentage of postsecondary completed (25‒34) and female
educational advantage, 1970‒2050
Source: Own elaboration based on data from Lutz, Butz, and K.C. (2014) for China, South Korea, and Japan, and Cheng and Loichinger
(2017) for Taiwan.
Demographic Research: Volume 43, Article 46
https://www.demographic-research.org 1379
3. Projecting trends in late singlehood until 2050
How would late singlehood rates look in the face of forthcoming demographic change?
In order to assess the implications of contemporary matching norms for future marriage
patterns, we apply a projection method developed and described in detail in Kashyap,
Esteve, and García-Román (2015). Briefly, we apply forces of attraction by age only and
by age and education, computed for the most recent period for each country to population
projections by age, and by age and education respectively. The forces of attraction can
be applied to the age-specific or age- and education-specific population at risk of
marriage to generate numbers of marriages occurring to men and women of a specific set
of characteristics. These marriages can be related to an age-specific population at risk in
a given period through an iterative, longitudinal cohort decrement process. The model
assumes that at age 15 all men and women are never married and readjusts the populations
at risk in successive periods by removing those that are married in each projection period
through the decrement process (see Appendix 1).
3.1 Scenarios with constant forces of attraction by sex and educational attainment
In the first scenario, we apply contemporary forces of attraction by age only to population
projections disaggregated by age and sex for each society. This projection scenario
captures the effect of changing population structure by age and sex brought about by
demographic changes that affect the age structure of the population, namely fertility
decline and sex ratio imbalances, on marriage prevalence. In a second scenario, we apply
prevailing forces of attraction by age and education to population projections
disaggregated by age, sex, and educational attainment. This scenario also captures the
effect of the shifting educational composition of the marriage market by sex. Figure 4
shows estimated proportions under both of these scenarios.
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Figure 4: Estimated proportions of never-married people by age 45‒49 from
2010 to 2050 by applying constant contemporary forces of attraction
by age-only, ij (solid line), and by age and education, ijkl (dashed
line), to population projections in four East Asian societies
Source: Own elaborations.
In China, the age-only projections (denoted by the solid, green line) show increasing
late singlehood among men, with the proportion never married going from under 5 to
10% between 2010 and 2050, which indicates the adverse impact of SRB distortions
combined with declining birth cohort size due to fertility decline. The same period sees
increasing marriage prevalence for women in China (yellow, solid line), as there are
fewer women relative to men in the marriage market.
In the age-only projections, Japanese men and women show increases in singlehood
initially, which then level off by 2015, when marriage patterns stabilize for women and
show slight decreases in singlehood for men. In contrast, the initial rises in singlehood
for South Korean and Taiwanese men are remarkable. If contemporary matching norms
by age continue, the interaction between norms and the changing demographic
composition of their marriage markets implies that these societies will experience levels
of nonmarriage exceeding that of Japan in the decades after 2030. After 2030, South
Korean men show an increase in singlehood, whereas women show a recuperation of
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marriage prevalence. The divergence between male and female marriage prevalence in
South Korea after 2030 reflects the effects of SRB distortions. Cohorts of 45–49 year
olds in South Korea in 2030 are those that were born in 1980–1985, when SRBs became
distorted in South Korea. A similar pattern, while less pronounced, is also suggested in
the Taiwanese age–sex projections. The divergence is less pronounced between male and
female marriage patterns in Taiwan, however, which reflects less distortion in Taiwanese
SRBs compared with those in South Korea. Nevertheless, the rise in the share of those
never married appears to be the starkest for men and women in Taiwan, reaching levels
around and above 30% in 2040‒2050.
The effect of changing educational composition of the marriage market for future
marriage prevalence for the four societies is indicated by the dashed line in Figure 4. For
China, proportions of never married are quite different under each of the two scenarios.
This indicates that current matching norms by age and education are not well adapted to
the patterns of gendered change in education that are anticipated in the marriage market.
For China, singlehood is higher in the age-education scenario for both men and women
after 2030 than in the age-only scenario. Women show recuperation of marriage after an
initial increase in the mid-2020s, while men show steadily increasing singlehood after
2030. The increasing singlehood in the age-education scenario is driven by worsening
prospects for the least-educated men and postsecondary-educated women, who are the
most affected by the hypergamous tendencies of contemporary matching norms.
In Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, accounting for the educational composition of
future marriage markets does not significantly alter the trends in nonmarriage for women
as compared to those predicted by the age-only scenario. In South Korea, men’s marriage
prospects are improved when the educational composition of future marriage markets are
accounted for – and this pattern is also visible, albeit less pronounced, in Taiwan. This is
likely due to the norms of educational homogamy in contemporary matching patterns in
South Korea that enable men to draw on a larger pool of postsecondary-educated women,
which offsets the otherwise adverse impact of the changing age and sex structure on
marriage for South Korean men after the 2030s. The relative stability in singlehood levels
in Japan, as well as the similarity between the age-only and age-education scenarios,
suggests an adaptation of Japanese matching norms to the growing numbers of highly
educated women in the marriage market – albeit at levels of singlehood hovering around
15% for women and 20‒25% for men. In contrast to the divergence seen in South Korea
and also Taiwan, male and female patterns of marriage show a similar trend, as Japan’s
population structure is the only one that is not affected by SRB distortions.
In 2010, singlehood levels in South Korea were 13% among men and 8% among
women, and in Taiwan were 12% among men and 10% among women. By 2020, both
South Korea and Taiwan show levels of late singlehood among men at 20% or higher. In
contrast to Japan, where late singlehood levels stabilize, in South Korea and Taiwan the
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persistence of prevailing norms amidst imminent demographic change point to even
higher levels of singlehood among men, reaching levels of 25% in South Korea and 34%
in Taiwan by 2050, and 15% in South Korea and 29% in Taiwan among women.
3.2 Projected trends in late singlehood by educational attainment, 2010‒2050
Figure 5 shows projected trends in the proportion never married at ages 45‒49 for 2010‒
2050, disaggregated by educational attainment for men (top panel) and women (bottom
panel). The figure only shows those educational groups that account for at least 3% of
the population in a given period. An educational gradient exists for all societies. Among
men, this follows the classical patterning of traditional male-breadwinner societies, in
which men with higher levels of education are more likely to marry than low-educated
ones (Jones and Gubhaju 2009; Cheng 2014; Park and Lee 2016). In China,
postsecondary-educated men will maintain their preeminence in the marriage market and
will be unlikely to experience high degrees of singlehood. In contrast, the fastest increases
in singlehood will occur among the growing group of men with only secondary education,
whereas the projections show stability for those with primary or less. South Korea and
Taiwan show the most significant increases in never-married populations without altering
the educational gradient favoring men with higher levels of education, whereas Japan
shows more stable trends.
Among women, the educational gradient follows the reverse pattern. For higher
levels of education, the proportion of those who have never been married among women
is higher, whereas women with low levels of education are always more likely to be
married. This is clearly the case for China, where almost no changes are expected among
women with primary or less education over this period. In South Korea, trends in
populations never married increase across both the secondary- and postsecondary-
educated groups. In Taiwan, never-married female populations indicate sharp increases
in the next two or three decades for all groups, but more rapidly among postsecondary-
educated populations and secondary-completed populations due to the shifting
educational compositions of Taiwan’s marriage markets. Notably, Japanese women show
some signs of reversal of the gradient, with postsecondary-educated women showing a
decline in nonmarriage, whereas secondary-educated women show increasing levels of
nonmarriage midway through the projection period.
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Figure 5: Estimated proportions of never-married people at age 45‒49 by
educational attainment and sex from 2010 to 2050 by applying
constant contemporary forces of attraction by age and education,
ijkl, to population projections in four East Asian societies
Men
Women
Source: Own elaborations. Only educational groups representing 3% or more of the total population are shown.
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3.3 Projected trends in late singlehood under alternative gender scenarios
The projection scenarios above, in which we vary the demographic composition of future
marriage markets but hold contemporary norms constant, show significant increases in
late singlehood, particularly among less educated men and highly educated women.
Could adjustments in marriage norms toward greater age and gender symmetry, or even
a reversal toward hypogamy, potentially stall these increases? In this section, we explore
how trends in late singlehood would look under two scenarios that alter the age and
educational distributions of matching norms by gender (Figure 6). Although to varying
degrees, the observed distribution in all countries reflects traditional hypergamous norms
(Hypergamy [observed] in Figure 6), the forces of attraction involving men with younger
women and lower levels of education are systematically higher than the opposite
combinations, as also shown in Figures 1 and 2. The first alternative scenario relaxes
observed hypergamous norms and assumes a gender-symmetrical distribution of norms
by age and educational attainment (Symmetry). We build this scenario by averaging
forces of attraction across both sides of the diagonal, thereby equalizing hypergamous
and hypogamous matching propensities while holding marriage intensity constant (i.e.,
without changing the sum of all marriage propensities). The second alternative scenario
reverses completely the gender pattern, assuming that men and women interchange
positions, and hypogamous propensities now exceed hypergamy in this scenario
(Hypogamy). In both the Symmetry and Hypogamy scenarios, the total sum of forces of
attraction remains the same, and thus we do not increase marriage intensities but only
seek to redistribute them by gender. In setting up the alternative scenarios in this way, we
can assess if increasing singlehood observed so far by applying contemporary norms to
shifting demographic composition is a consequence of generalized weakened
propensities to marry, or linked to the gender redistribution of marriage norms.
Figure 6 shows the results of this projection exercise. Each set of forces of attractions
(identified by the title of each panel) is applied to projected age-sex-educational
composition of the marriage market in each population. In Figure 6, we show the
proportion of women and men born during the 2000‒2005 period that will remain single
by year 2050, when they will be between 45 and 49 years old. By following this specific
cohort, which is 15‒19 at the beginning of our projection period and first enters the
population at risk for marriage, we are able to model the risk of marriage of this entire
cohort across their life course with the same set of forces of attraction.
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Figure 6: Estimated proportions of people who have never been married at
ages 45‒49 by sex for cohorts born in 2000‒2005, applying two
alternative gender distributions of forces of attraction in each
country in comparison with observed hypergamy: symmetry
(hypergamy = hypogamy) and hypogamy (complete reversal of the
observed pattern)
Source: Own elaborations.
Results from these projections show that the overall proportion of the single
population will not experience significant changes in either of the two alternative
scenarios compared with the observed hypergamy scenario, which suggests that relative
shifts in gender matching norms without a modification of the overall intensity of
marriage would presumably have little impact on singlehood levels. However, these
scenarios suggest slight to modest variations in the proportion of singles by sex. For
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the shift from the hypergamy to the symmetry and to the
hypogamy scenarios implies an increase in singlehood levels for women and a decrease
for men. In Japan and Taiwan, the hypogamy scenario yields similar proportions of single
women and men. In South Korea, on the other hand, women are more likely to remain
single than men, reversing the traditional order. In China, however, men experience little
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change in the proportion of singles, but marriage prospects for women improve. Trends
by educational attainment (results shown in the Appendix 3) show that there are neither
large differences across scenarios nor consistent trends in such differences across
countries. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, the marriage prospects of postsecondary-
educated men increase slightly under the ‘symmetry’ and ‘hypogamy’ scenarios, whereas
postsecondary-educated women are less likely to marry. In China, the transition from
hypergamy to hypogamy yields higher proportions of singles among postsecondary-
educated men and reduces the percentage of women with postsecondary education that
remain single, due to the strength of hypergamy in contemporary norms that disfavor
postsecondary-educated women.
4. Conclusions
This paper has made a twofold contribution. First, we have characterized marriage
matching norms by age and education in four East Asian societies. Second, we have
examined the potential implications of these prevailing norms in the context of
forthcoming demographic change in the marriage market in each of these societies for
marriage universality, as measured by late singlehood. These societies represent marriage
regimes at different stages of the transition to later and lesser marriage, but share a
common past of earlier, universal, and gender-asymmetrical marriage. Our marriage
projections suggest that, if prevailing norms in each of these contexts were to continue,
the universality of marriage would be substantially eroded in the coming decades, as
indicated by increasing proportions of singles (who remain married by ages 45‒49). This
change is already evident in Japan, where late singles in 2010 were 20% for men and
12% for women, and appear to stabilize at levels of 23% for men and 16% for women by
2050 in our projections. Similar patterns may also appear in South Korea and Taiwan,
where late singlehood levels in 2010 were still around 10% but will more than double by
2050. In our projections, these changes arise purely as a consequence of shifting
demographic composition in the marriage market, signaling the important interaction
between marriage norms and demographic changes in shaping observed marriage
patterns at the population level. In China, our projections suggest substantial increases in
levels of singlehood compared to their starting levels in 2010, but lower than those
observed in South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan by 2050. Shifting educational composition
in the marriage market will further increase singlehood levels for men in China. Although
existing literature has signaled the forthcoming impact of sex ratio at birth imbalances
for increasing singlehood among men in China (Guilmoto 2012; Sharygin, Ebenstein,
and Das Gupta 2013), our projections have shown that female educational expansion will
also play a significant role for concurrent increases in singlehood among women.
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When disaggregating singlehood by educational groups and keeping contemporary
matching norms constant, we see a clear continuation of the educational gradient in
marriage among men, with the biggest increases in late singlehood among the lower-
educated groups and with postsecondary-educated groups experiencing either decreasing
late singlehood in China, stability in Japan, or less steep increases in South Korea and
Taiwan. For women, the educational pattern in late singlehood is the opposite as that
found among men. Postsecondary-educated women face greater levels of late singlehood.
The only exception is Japan, where we see a reversal in 2030 with postsecondary-
educated women experiencing declines in late singlehood. This finding is consistent with
a recent study on Japanese marriage which shows turnover of the negative educational
gradient in women’s total first marriage rates after 2009 (Fukuda, Raymo, and Yoda
2020). Reversal of the negative educational gradient in women’s marriage in Japan is
paralleled with increasing valuation of women’s earning capacity and emergence of
positive relationship between women’s earnings and marriage in the 2000s in Japan
(Fukuda 2013).
The abovementioned scenarios have assumed that current matching norms remain
constant, but this assumption shows – particularly in the case of South Korea and Taiwan,
where we see sharp increases in late singlehood relative to their 2010 levels – how
prevailing matching norms are maladjusted to forthcoming demographic change in the
marriage markets of these populations. In the case of Taiwan and South Korea, current
forces of attraction observed in recent marriages may be capturing a period of rapid
change in marriage norms across cohorts, where older cohorts were married under a
different set of matching norms than those of younger cohorts. The older cohorts in these
contexts married early, and their marriage behavior does not set a precedent for the
younger cohorts to follow. In contrast, if contemporary norms continue in Japan,
increases in singlehood will be less steep compared with South Korea and Taiwan. The
fact that female educational expansion has a longer history in Japan compared with South
Korea and Taiwan suggests a gradual adaptation of Japanese matching norms to the
shifting demographic composition of the marriage market has already emerged. Although
the share of these more gender-symmetrical tendencies has increased, this has occurred
alongside a generalized weakening of marriage propensities overall, as indicated by
weaker forces of attraction.
In counterfactual scenarios, we applied two alternative sets of gender matching
norms across societies whilst holding contemporary propensities to marry constant
overall. These scenarios enabled us to assess if the increasing singlehood arising from the
interaction of demographic changes with contemporary norms was driven more by the
gender distribution of norms (i.e., hypergamy by age and education) or more by the
generalized weakening of propensities to marry that have emerged in the marriage market
of these societies. With these further counterfactual scenarios, we have shown how
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moving toward more gender-symmetrical matching norms (homogamous) or toward
hypogamous patterns would have modest effects on the overall levels of singlehood, but
would have implications for the gender gradients in marriage formation. In China, an
uptake of hypogamous norms would increase marriage prevalence for women, in
particular those with high education, while depressing marriage prospects of men. In
contrast, in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, a shift from hypergamous to hypogamous norms
signals an improvement in marriage prospects for men, especially among those who are
postsecondary educated, and a reduction in marriage for women, resulting in a narrowing
of the differences between men’s and women’s singlehood rates. These scenarios thus
suggest that even considerable redistribution in the forces of attraction in these societies
would have a modest impact on singlehood, given generalized weakened marriage norms
that have emerged.
We acknowledge several limitations of this study. First, our marriage projections
take population projections by age, sex, and educational attainment as inputs. These
population projections make certain assumptions about future patterns of change, which
if erroneous have implications for our own results. We have tried to limit some of the
uncertainty by projecting until 2050 and focusing largely on cohorts that are already born
and subject to prevailing educational transition rates, with our youngest cohorts born in
2000‒2005. Furthermore, our projections focus on national-level populations, which
mask significant regional heterogeneities, particularly in large, diverse societies such as
China. This was due to the limited availability of population projections by age and
education at subnational levels. We have also assumed nationally bounded marriage
markets when considering the population at risk for marriage. Marriage migration has
been noted as social development in recent years in South Korea and Taiwan, and these
trends will also affect how marriage patterns develop in these societies (Lee, Lindy, and
Florio 2016; Raymo and Park 2020). While we have accounted for transnational
marriages when estimating forces of attraction, it is difficult to delimit a potential
population at risk for marriage when accounting for the possibility of marriage migration.
As a result, our projections underestimate the impact of marriage migration, which may
serve to lessen the projected increases in singlehood. We also considered age and
education as two dimensions of stratification in our analyses. Several other dimensions
of stratification, for example ethnicity, are also salient for marriage markets. Moreover,
our focus here has been comparative, and as our analyses has shown, education is an
important dimension of socioeconomic stratification across each of these marriage
markets. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the educational systems are quite different
in each of these countries, and while our grouping facilitates comparison, it may also
mask important heterogeneity within educational categories. For example, in our
postsecondary-educated group, vocational schools, junior colleges and four-year
postsecondary degrees are included. These capture different types of educational
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qualifications, which have implications for patterns of assortative mating, but are difficult
to operationalize in the context of our cross-national research combining multiple sources
of data and in light of the fact that our analyses are constrained by the educational
classification used in the underlying population projections. Alongside educational
expansion, we also note that the meaning of education has changed over time in each of
these countries, but especially in Japan and South Korea, where the proportions with less
than secondary education are now very small as a proportion of the population. The
meaning associated with these qualifications has implications for how they are perceived
in the marriage market. For example, while marriage propensities among lower-educated
groups remain comparatively high in China, these patterns may change as this group
becomes smaller and higher education becomes more widespread. We hope future work
will address several of these limitations and assess if and how norms respond to the
shifting demographic composition in these societies.
In any case, our projections results suggest a plausible reduction in the prevalence
of marriage in the future decades in these four societies that arises from the interaction
between weakened propensities to marry and forthcoming demographic changes in East
Asian societies. Our analyses highlight the importance of considering demographic
changes in the composition of marriage markets While our projections are a conterfactual
exercise based on assumptions, they illustrate how the unfolding of ongoing demographic
changes in the context of prevailing norms will result in these societies witnessing levels
of singlehood that are unprecedented. In absolute numbers, and according to our
projections that hold contemporary norms constant, late singles among 45 to 49 years old
would increase from 1.78 million in 2010 to 6.09 in 2050 in China. In South Korea and
Taiwan, the number of singles among the same ages would double between 2010 and
2050 from 0.21 to 0.44 million in South Korea and from 0.21 to 0.38 in Taiwan. In
contrast, singles would slightly decrease in Japan from 1.28 to 1.16 million between 2010
and 2050. Even when some of these propensities are redistributed, as in our alternative
gender scenarios, singlehood would increase in three out of four countries, suggesting
that unless a generalized increase in propensities to marry take place, universal marriage
will be eroded in East Asia. The potential implications of such trends are broad, not just
for the institution of marriage itself but for fertility and social reproduction, as well as the
broader family context of old-age support in these societies. Marriages, as unions formed
between two families, lay the foundation for social solidarity in collectivist settings like
Asia. Changes in marriage regimes can thus have profound impact on the social fabric of
these East Asian societies, particularly when marriage remains the normative type of
union commonly recognized and considered as the ideal context for childbearing. As
shown in the case of Japan, fertility – and in particular childlessness – is closely tied to
marriage, and childlessness has been the main driver of the decline in fertility in Japan
over recent decades (Raymo et al. 2015). Unlike in Western societies, the postponement
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of marriage in Asia has not been accompanied by a substantial increase in cohabitation
and childbearing out of wedlock (Lesthaeghe 2010). The extent to which nonmarital
cohabitation and childbearing emerge in the future will very much determine how
marriage will influence fertility trends, population growth, aging, and social
reproduction.
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Appendix 1: Detailed description of the method and data used in the
marriage projections
Marriage outcomes are shaped by both preferences or norms about whom to marry as
well as the availability of potential partners. The harmonic mean marriage function
proposed by Schoen (1988) provides a simple, elegant function to link the numbers of
marriages occurring to the population at risk of experiencing marriage and allows for the
estimation of a parameter that captures the composition-independent propensity or
likelihood of marriage. The model relates the number of marriages occurring between
men of type i to women of type j to the eligible (unmarried) men and women of those
classes.
(1).
In equation (1),  is the number of marriages between men aged i and women
aged j in some time period;  is the number of unmarried men aged i in the middle of
that time period;  is the number of eligible women aged j in the middle of that time
period; m, n is the length of the ith and jth age intervals respectively (in years), and
is the ‘force of attraction’ between men aged i and women aged j.
As we are interested in examining pairing patterns across both age and educational
attainment, the number of marriages as well as the risk population can be simultaneously
identified across two categories – age and educational level. The model applied to this
case is:
(2).
Here  is the number of marriages between men aged i with educational level k
and women aged j with educational level l in some time period;  is the number of
unmarried men aged i with educational level k in the middle of that time period;  is
the number of eligible women aged j with educational level l in the middle of that time
period; m, n is the length of the ith and jth age intervals respectively (in years), and
N ij   ij
M iF j





N ijkl   ijkl
M ikF jl
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is the force of attraction between men aged i with educational level k and women aged j
with educational level l.
By relating the number of marriages actually occurring with the population at risk
of marriage for both sexes, the force of attraction captures the composition-
independent propensity to marry between men and women belonging to a group of
specific age (i, j) and educational attainment level (k, l). This parameter can be thought
to capture the desirability of marriage and matching norms between men and women of
specific age and educational characteristics. If men (Mik) and women (Wjl) with given
characteristics randomly encounter each other at equal rates, then higher propensities to
marry ( ) indicate that higher rates of such encounters are likely to result in marriage
(Qian and Preston 1993: 483). The analysis is restricted to registered first marriages
involving one native-born partner.
To compute forces of attraction, data on marriages cross-tabulated by spousal
characteristics, in this case age and age by educational attainment, and data for the
population at risk of experiencing these marriages are needed. The population at risk of
first marriage is the single (never-married) population. The latest published marriage data
in each society were used, but this does not always coincide with the latest registered
data. Hence, reference periods and statistical sources vary by country. Marriage data
come from censuses (China), surveys (Japan), and vital statistics (South Korea and
Taiwan). Marriages in China refer to the 2000‒2004 period and come from the 2005
Chinese population micro-census. The question on year of first marriage was used to
select respondents who were married between 2000 and 2004, and information on
relationship to the household head was then applied to identify spouses. In Japan,
marriages refer to the 2006‒2010 period and are registered in the 2010 National Fertility
Survey. Finally, information on marriages for Taiwan and South Korea was obtained
from vital statistics. In the case of Taiwan, they refer to 2010, and in South Korea, to the
period between 2001 and 2009.
The populations at risk of getting married correspond to the single (never-married)
population by sex, age, and educational attainment. When the marriages that occur refer
to periods of more than one year, the middle of the period is taken to identify populations
at risk. For China, we averaged the 2000 and 2005 populations obtained from the
censuses taken at those years. For Japan, we used the 2010 census, in South Korea the
2001 and 2010 population censuses, and in Taiwan the 2010 census.
Age at marriage was grouped into five-year intervals from 15 to 49 years of age,
except for the first and second age groups (15, 16‒19). Educational attainment was
harmonized across societies into four groups: ‘Less than primary’ (ISCED 0), ‘Primary
completed’ (ISCED 1), ‘Secondary completed’ (ISCED 2 and 3), and ‘Postsecondary
completed’ (ISCED 4 and above). ‘Less than primary’ in Japan and Taiwan was excluded
or combined with ‘Primary completed’ because of their very small sample size.
 ijkl
 ijkl
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Appendix 2: Population pyramids by age and educational composition in four
East Asian societies, 2010‒2050
China
South Korea
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Appendix 2: Population pyramids by age and educational composition in four
Asian societies, 2010‒2050 (continuation)
Taiwan
Japan
Source: Own elaboration based on population projections from Lutz, Butz, and K.C. (2014) for China, South Korea, and Japan; and
from Cheng and Loichinger (2017) for Taiwan.
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Appendix 3: Estimated proportions of never married people at ages 45‒49 by sex
and educational attainment for cohorts born in 2000‒2005 applying
three alternative gender distributions of forces of attraction in each
country: observed hypergamy; symmetry (hypergamy = hypogamy);
and hypogamy (complete reversal of the observed pattern)
Source: Own elaborations.
